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Book Review 
LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT 
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. By 
Paul W. Kahn.t New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 260. $27.50. 
Daniel 0. Conk/ez 
For those who grimace at the thought of another book about 
constitutional theory, think again. In Legitimacy and History, 
Professor Paul W. Kahn offers a fascinating and richly nuanced 
intellectual history and critique of American constitutional the-
ory. This is an outstanding book. It contains original and impor-
tant insights not only about historical developments, but also 
about the predicament of contemporary constitutional thought. 
The task of constitutional theory is to reconcile the concept 
of self-government with the existence of constitutional limita-
tions on the exercise of political power. To accomplish this task, 
according to Kahn, a theory of constitutional government must 
address the passage of time since the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. Thus, in the hands of Kahn, what Alexander Bickel called 
the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"J becomes "the problem of 
temporality." Why should the self-governing present be bound 
by the constitutional enactments of the past? To answer this 
question, Kahn writes, one must appeal to the political self-iden-
tification of citizens. More precisely, one must link citizens to the 
Constitution in such a way that they regard the Constitution, 
however dated its enactment, as somehow a product of their own 
self-government. Relatedly, one must address the relative roles 
of "reason" (political "science" or truth) and "will" (democratic 
1. Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
2. Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow, Indiana University at 
Bloomington. 
3. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics 16-23 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). 
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consent or legitimacy) in one's understanding of constitutional 
government. 
The problem of temporality varies in complexion during dif-
ferent historical periods, and so gives rise to different theoretical 
responses. Kahn divides the history of American constitutional 
theory into four major periods, each of them dominated by a par-
ticular conceptual model. A model of "making" dominated the 
founding period, but by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
this model had been replaced by one of "organic maintenance." 
Thereafter, there arose a model of constitutional "growth" or 
"evolution," which served to justify both the Lochner era4 and, 
ironically, Lochner's demise. Finally, in the contemporary pe-
riod, Kahn claims that the model of growth has given way to a 
model of "community," which attempts to ground constitutional 
government in a community of discourse. 
Not surprisingly, temporality was not a problem under the 
"making" model of the founding period. During this period, the 
Constitution was regarded as an object to be formed by the peo-
ple, acting as political artisans schooled in the science of politics. 
The self-governing acts by which the Constitution was created 
thus served to synthesize the reason of political science with the 
will of democratic consent. At least in theory, this synthesis 
of reason and will extended to the entire nation, so citizens could 
properly regard the Constitution as a product of their own self-
government. Interestingly, as Kahn observes, the model of mak-
ing continued to dominate during the post-ratification period 
and, in particular, in the jurisprudence of Chief Justice John 
Marshall. Thus, in cases such as Marbury v. Madison 5 and 
McCulloch v. Maryland,6 Marshall first defended his major con-
stitutional conclusions as a matter of basic reason or scientific 
deduction, and only then did he turn for additional support to the 
actual language of the Constitution. By proceeding in this fash-
ion, Marshall perpetuated the synthesis of reason and will, sug-
gesting that the scientific truths of constitutional government 
were linked to and legitimated by the positive text that the peo-
ple had enacted. 
As America moved toward the middle of the nineteenth 
century and, relatedly, toward the Civil War, faith in the science 
of politics declined. With the passage of time, moreover, no 
longer could the Constitution be viewed as an act of contempo-
4. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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rary self-government. To cope with the problem of temporality, 
constitutional theory progressed from the model of making to a 
model of "organic maintenance." Under this model, the state 
was understood as a living organism constituted by the people. 
This organism had taken on life at the founding; now, it was to be 
maintained and preserved. Citizens could embrace the Constitu-
tion as an act of their own self-government through an intertem-
poral identification with the Founders. Indeed, citizens were at 
one with the Founders, part of the same organic unit, and the 
Founders' Constitution became an object of almost sacred rever-
ence. Reason and will no longer converged. Instead, the will of 
the Founders was paramount. Constitutional interpretation 
therefore was properly based not on science, but rather on his-
tory, and originalism became the central interpretive principle. 
Under this model, there was broad agreement that the Foun-
ders' Constitution should be honored and conserved. At the 
same time, however, there was radical disagreement concerning 
the meaning of the Constitution and its bearing on the national 
crisis that became the Civil War. "Everyone agreed that they 
were the children of the founding fathers, but they did not agree 
on the meaning of the familial obligation." Thus, thinkers as di-
verse as Joseph Story, John Calhoun, Roger Taney, Abraham 
Lincoln, and Stephen Douglas, each in his own way, could em-
brace the maintenance model of constitutional government even 
as they vigorously debated its implications. 
In Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 for example, Chief Justice Taney 
relied on the Constitution's "true intent and meaning when it was 
adopted"s in ruling that Blacks could not become citizens of the 
United States and that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitu-
tional. For Taney, citizens' intertemporal identification with the 
Founders depended on the maintenance of intergenerational 
bloodlines, bloodlines that were racially distinct. Blacks, quite 
simply, were not part of the American constitutional organism. 
For Lincoln, by contrast, the inheritance from the Founders was 
moral, not biological, and to identify with the Founders was to 
identify with a vision of liberty and equality. Citizens' intertem-
poral link to the Founders took on a religious dimension, with 
citizens transcending their individual finitude by becoming part 
of the Founders' project, even to the point of "[giving] their lives 
7. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
8. Id. at 405. 
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that [the] nation might live,"9 this in penance for the corporate 
sin of slavery.to 
The model of organic maintenance continued to dominate in 
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. The Fourteenth 
Amendment, for example, was defended not as a constitutional 
innovation, but rather as a return to the Founders' vision. At the 
same time, however, the underpinnings of the maintenance 
model were weakening. As each decade passed, it became more 
and more difficult to justify an intertemporal identification with 
the Founders, and the idea of progress suggested that the will of 
the Founders might be little more than the dead hand of the past. 
Reason returned to constitutional theory under a new model, 
that of "growth" or "evolution." Unlike the abstract political sci-
ence of the founding period, however, reason now was the prod-
uct of rational experience, with the Constitution understood to 
be evolving toward a comprehensively rational constitutional or-
der. The nation remained a historically continuous political com-
munity, and history remained an important component in the 
"science" of constitutional governance, but the founding lost its 
special significance. 
As with the earlier model of maintenance, agreement on the 
model of evolution did not mean agreement on its substantive 
implications. Likewise, it did not mean agreement on the proper 
locus of constitutional growth. For some, the proper locus was 
the courts; for others, the popular branches. 
The model of constitutional evolution emerged first in theo-
retical writings and only later in the courts. Among the theoreti-
cal writings that Kahn discusses are the works of Sidney George 
Fisher, Thomas Cooley, Christopher Tiedeman, Francis Wharton, 
James Thayer, and Woodrow Wilson. In the courts, the model of 
evolution developed gradually in the decades following the Civil 
War, taking full form in the Supreme Court's 1905 decision in 
Lochner v. New York.ll 
The "progressive science" of the Lochner era12 was guided 
by the experience of the common law, adapted to current condi-
tions, and by the "common understandings" of the day,B which 
9. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Get-
tysburg, November 19, 1863, in Roy P. Basler, ed., Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and 
Writings 734 (World Publishing Co., 1946). 
10. See Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, in Basler, ed., 
Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings at 792 (cited in note 9). 
11. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
12. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 385 (1898). 
13. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59. 
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included a commitment to laissez faire. This notion of "scien-
tific" governance by the judiciary, however, proved to be unsta-
ble. Legal realism provided a general critique of judicial 
rationality. Even more telling was the rise of empirical science, 
which questioned the reliability of the common law, displaced 
"common understandings," and undermined the philosophy of 
the free market as an ending point for constitutional government. 
Given its changing character, the science of government was no 
longer within the competence of the courts, but instead was bet-
ter suited for legislative or administrative inquiry. The model of 
evolution remained in place, along with its commitment to rea-
son, as reflected in "the best science" of the day. Thus, according 
to Kahn, the constitutional crisis of the 1930s did not involve a 
conceptual revolution. But with the fall of Lochner, the locus of 
"the best science," and therefore the locus of constitutional 
evolution, had shifted from the courts to the popular branches. 
In the wake of the 1930s, however, the lesson of Lochner 
and its demise was reconceived. In hindsight, the constitutional 
shift of the 1930s was viewed not as a product of changing sci-
ence, but rather as a victory for majoritarian rule. In accordance 
with this new understanding, the judicial protection of individual 
rights now gave rise to the "countermajoritarian difficulty." Re-
latedly, the question for modem constitutional theory became a 
new question of proper locus, this time the proper locus of will or 
consent. The model of evolution had addressed the problem of 
temporality by appealing to a sense of reason that would reso-
nate in the present, permitting citizens to identify with the Con-
stitution as a product of their own generation. But the evolution 
model had focused on reason at the expense of will. It had sug-
gested that the Constitution was to embody the will of the pres-
ent, but it did not resolve the question of where that will should 
properly reside. Should it rest in the autonomy of each individ-
ual citizen or in the political community as a whole, acting 
through the popular branches? The debate between autonomy 
and majoritarian rule thus became the central issue of modem 
constitutional theory. 
Like earlier debates, this one has included both academic 
commentary and judicial decision making. Kahn discusses and 
criticizes the writings of Learned Hand, Herbert Wechsler, Alex-
ander Bickel, and John Ely, among others, and he also considers 
a variety of modem decisions in which the Supreme Court has 
embraced individual autonomy as a touchstone of constitutional 
law. He examines not only the "privacy" decisions culminating 
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in Roe v. Wade,t4 but also a range of other cases that, according 
to Kahn, can be understood to protect autonomy. In Kahn's 
view, for example, the Court's equal protection doctrine rejects 
historical categories in favor of individual self-definition through 
the exercise of autonomy. In striking contrast to the citizen of 
the nineteenth century's organic maintenance model, the autono-
mous citizen of the modern period is not part of an organic unit. 
Rather, each citizen is a self-made individual who belongs to no 
one else. 
The judicial protection of autonomy remains controversial, 
of course, and another strand of modern constitutional theory ar-
gues in favor of majoritarian rule. But the theories of autonomy 
and majoritarian rule both promote the primacy of will over rea-
son. Both reject, either explicitly or implicitly, the notion that 
substantive values can be tested against the standards of reason. 
Instead, such values are simply a matter of subjective preference, 
whether that of the autonomous individual or that of the gov-
erning majority. 
The claims of the autonomous individual and of the gov-
erning majority have no logical stopping points, and they create 
the dilemma that recently has given rise to the fourth model of 
constitutional theory. Like the model of evolution, the model of 
"community," at least in many of its variants, addresses the prob-
lem of temporality by linking the Constitution directly to the 
present. More distinctively, this model attempts to resolve the 
dilemma of will through a conceptual device that connects the 
autonomous individual to the majority. This device is the com-
munity of discourse. 
Unlike the previous three models, the model of community 
is an academic product that has had little influence in the courts. 
As a result, Kahn devotes his discussion to the academic litera-
ture, which consists of two related schools of thought: the new 
republicanism of such writers as Bruce Ackerman, Frank 
Michelman, and Cass Sunstein; and the "interpretivism" (broadly 
defined) of such theorists as Owen Fiss, Robert Cover, and Ron-
ald Dworkin. Although their theories differ in many respects, 
these various republican and interpretive thinkers all embrace 
the concept of a community of discourse. Accordingly, each the-
orist defines the particular sort of discursive community he has in 
mind, including its institutional as well as its temporal location. 
14. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
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Despite their best efforts, these community theorists cannot 
resolve the dilemma of will. Discourse can involve the exercise 
of "positive freedom," a process by which the individual and the 
community engage in a mutual creation of meaning. Through 
this process, individual autonomy merges with the community's 
definition of value, and the dilemma of will disappears. The 
model of community thus can create an identity between individ-
uals and the constitutional order of which they are a part. As 
Kahn explains, however, no community of discourse includes all 
(or even most) citizens, and those who are excluded are not en-
gaged in the exercise of positive freedom. To the contrary, for 
these (most) citizens, the coercion of the constitutional order 
works to frustrate their freedom, in the sense of individual auton-
omy, and the dilemma of will remains unresolved. Even if the 
judiciary, the legislature, or some other interpretive institution 
can be viewed as "a self-generative, dialogic community, [this] 
has nothing to do with the authority the institution exercises over 
the rest of the political community." Kahn thus agrees with Rob-
ert Cover that the constitutional order is less the product of a 
community of discourse than an attempt to silence the many 
competing voices in our society. 
Kahn believes that the sequential development of the four 
models of constitutional theory has been a matter of logical pro-
gression. Under the making model, there was a synthesis of rea-
son and will. With the passage of time, however, new theories 
were required to justify the constitutional order for generations 
farther and farther removed from the founding. The synthesis of 
reason and will disappeared. Under the model of maintenance, 
constitutional theory emphasized will to the exclusion of reason. 
Later, the model of evolution reversed this preference, de-em-
phasizing will and focusing instead on the importance of reason. 
The model of community attempts to regain the synthesis, 
bringing constitutional theory full circle. Under the community 
model, citizens are to create their own sense of meaning-their 
own sense of reason-through an act of will, the act of communi-
tarian discourse. For Kahn, this model represents "the end of 
constitutional theory." But, as Kahn explains, this final model of 
constitutional theory cannot resolve the dilemma of will and 
therefore cannot justify the constitutional order. Indeed, be-
cause the model of discursive community is inconsistent with 
every assertion of authority outside the discourse, Kahn argues 
that it is ultimately subversive of the constitutional order. More 
generally, Kahn concludes that the problem of constitutional the-
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ory simply cannot be resolved: "Under the conditions of tempo-
rality within which any state exists, self-government is not 
possible." 
Nowhere have I encountered a more engaging book about 
constitutional theory. Kahn brings a wealth of historical re-
sources to bear, and he offers a probing analytical critique of the 
materials that he confronts. His description of recent works of 
constitutional theory is lucid, sometimes more so than the origi-
nals. He cuts to the heart of each theoretical effort and deftly 
exposes its primary weaknesses. Likewise, Kahn makes a 
number of insightful observations concerning the judicial deci-
sions that he discusses. What is more, he ties his book together 
with an original and provocative explanation of the historical 
progression of constitutional thought. 
This book is not without shortcomings. Although Kahn dis-
cusses earlier judicial decisions, often at length, he has very little 
to say about recent trends in the Supreme Court. As Kahn notes, 
the Court has been largely unaffected by the work of contempo-
rary academics, but surely the Court's decisions in the 1980s and 
1990s have their own implications for the path of constitutional 
theory. 
Further, Kahn's argument of logical progression is subject to 
challenge. Kahn makes a convincing case for the development of 
each of the models that he discusses, but as he concedes, the 
older models have never been purged from constitutional theory. 
Instead, they remain available as sources of justification for con-
stitutional decision makers such as the Supreme Court. Kahn 
gives some attention to the continuing influence of these older 
models, but he might have done more in this respect. Even to-
day, for example, the maintenance model exerts a considerable 
pull, perhaps in part for reasons that can be traced to the making 
model. In particular, we may respect the will of the Founders not 
simply for its own sake, but rather because we actually trust the 
Founders' wisdom, the sense of reason or political "science" that 
their will reflects. Likewise, the model of growth remains a pow-
erful force in contemporary constitutional theory. Not everyone, 
and certainly not the Supreme Court, has fallen prey to "the 
communitarian virus sweeping constitutional theory." Outside 
the academy, at least, it seems that the dominant models of con-
stitutional theory continue to be those of organic maintenance 
and growth, not communitarian discourse. 
Kahn is right in suggesting that the predicament of contem-
porary constitutional theory is tied to t~e contest .betwee~ a?ton-
omy and majoritarian rule, and that th1s contest m turn 1s hnked 
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to the increasingly prevalent belief that normative moral judg-
ments are matters simply of personal preference. The problem 
of moral skepticism, however, runs deep and wide in American 
culture; it is hardly unique to constitutional theory. For us to 
move beyond the impasse of contemporary constitutional theory, 
we must confront the moral predicament of American society in 
general. We must address the existence and meaning of moral 
truth in the radically pluralistic, and increasingly polarized, soci-
ety in which we live. A daunting challenge, to say the least. 
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND 
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE. By Howard Gillman.1 Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 317. $29.95. 
Herbert Hovenkampz 
Gillman's book is another in a long and growing list of titles 
written in the 1980s and early 1990s designed to illuminate the 
Lochner era in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Gillman is inter-
ested mainly in antecedents, beginning with the Founders and fo-
cusing heavily on the Jackson period. Like most good recent 
writing on this subject, Gillman eschews the use of legal "formal-
ism" as an explanatory paradigm. That notion, that the judges 
were rule-bound lawyers who separated law from policy, explains 
little and is, in any event, wrong. Substantive due process was 
driven by policy concerns just as much as landmark twentieth-
century decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education or Roe v. 
Wade, and the judges who espoused it were a highly creative and 
energetic group. 
Gillman argues that although substantive due process was 
formalized in American constitutional thought in the 1880s and 
after, its presence is detectable much earlier than historians have 
generally realized. Indeed, one can find it as early as the late 
eighteenth century, and it becomes quite visible already in the 
second decade of the nineteenth century. As he notes, the great 
revolution in ideas of free trade that facilitated the rise of the 
Jacksonian movement and an incipient national market created a 
corresponding hostility toward parochial state and local regula-
tions that tended to favor hometown businesses at the expense of 
1. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California. 
2. Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
